Chapter III

Treating of the Subjects cognate to Cryptography and the Place of
Cryptography among them.

Most truly has it been said of Aristotle, De Anima, Bk.I.c.1, that the principles of the various branches of learning depend on the science of the soul.  Cicero had the same idea when, in speaking of jurisprudence, he said, “The science of the law must be deduced from human nature itself”, i.e. from man’s distinguishing characteristics.  The fact that this is true leads us to some necessary discussion here, but the truth having been called to our attention by Aristotle, the discussion need be but brief.

The distinguishing characteristics of man, so far as concerns our present investigation, are in part considered with reference to the soul, and in part considered with reference to the soul and the boby combined, and are reason, speech and writing.

That reason is a distinguishing characteristic is granted by all investigators of nature; in fact, it is even called the only such characteristic.

With respect to speech, however, and still more with respect to writing, there is among these same investigators the deepest silence.  Speech, or articulate reason, the basis of which lies wholly within the soul, while the instrument of its operation is in the body, seems to have been mentioned in this connection for the first time by Casmannus, Physiol., Bk.I.  And rightly was it so mentioned, as Thomas Sagittarius, Exerc. Phys. (Exerc. 24, th. 20, lit.a), proves by good arguments.  Writing also, or rather the faculty of writing, is brought under this head by Keckermann, Syst. Phys., Bk. IV. c.8.  And with reason, for there is a close connection between the voice and writing.  For, as the spoken word is the image of the mind’s thoughts, so is writing the image of the word uttered or to be uttered by the mouth.  Now although these faculties are natural faculties, they are nevertheless improved by art.  So, logic amends, guides and shapes reason, and standing in no need of external instrument (Scaliger, Exerc. 307, Sect. 23), is content with thus shaping reason, without in itself having regard for speech or writing.  It does not, however, wholly exclude these from its care, and most of all is this the case when thoughts are to be communicated to others.  Speech, and consequently writing also, is shaped principally by grammar.  Grammar is, therefore, defined by Quintilian as a fixed method of talking and writing, though those who would be more exact are loud in their assertion that the word writing is included in correct speaking; see the Giessen Professors, Gramm. Bk.I.c.1, and Goelerius, Problem. Gramm., Bk.I.c.1.  Furthermore, there is Rhetoric, which takes for its field the shaping of both talking and writing.  Grammar and rhetoric, however, do not say everything that can and should be said about writing, but they leave to the study of letters some remarks still to be made on the subject.  This is abundantly shown by Herman Hugo in the course of his excellent treatise De Prima Scribendi Origine et Universa Rei Literariae Antiquitate.  Thus, there may be brought to the service of writing a something further which lies outside and beyond the artistic scope of both grammar and rhetoric, and from this something there may be formed a special art.  It was in this way, we find,  that the poetic art was superadded to these two, grammar and rhetoric.  For, when to reason and speech, in order that these might be of some use in the way of giving delight to men, there came to be joined rhythm, fictitious narratives, and representations of tragic and comic situations, then was poetry born and received into the number of the arts; see Piccolomini